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In this paper, we study emission controls and market equilibrium. The global warming is an
urgent issue to be addressed throughout the entire world. Industrialized nations have emitted far
more greenhouse gas emissions, consequently, the signicance of emission controls are discussed
broadly in recent years. The argument of emission controls is developed at not only the political
level, but also the academic level. In fact, there are many existing literature studying emission
controls.
Existing literature consider pollution taxes, tradable emission permits and imperfect compe-
tition, however, they do not consider any uncertainty of pollution. von der Fehr (1993) studies
tradable emission rights and strategic interaction. He shows strategic manipulation may have
negative welfare eects in the market. Simpson (1995) studies optimal pollution tax in Cournot
duopoly. He shows the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage. Sartzetakis (1997)
studies tradable emission permits regulations under imperfect competition. He shows social
welfare is higher under the TEP relative to the CC regulation. Tanaka and Chen (2012) study
tradable emission permits in electricity markets. They show diverting emission permits reduces
the power and the permit prices. Mansur (2013) studies tradable permits are preferable to
taxes under imperfect competition. He shows strategic behavior reduced local emissions by
approximately 9%.
We consider uncertainty of pollution, rm's entry-exit decision and pollution tax in Cournot
duopoly by combining Wirl (2006) and Simpson (1995). Outputs of the model are dynamics of
pollution and equilibrium market supply. It is shown that environmental regulation decreases
duration and amount of pollution, pollution uncertainty increases duration and amount of pol-
lution, and market size increases increment of pollution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our entry-exit pollution
model in monopoly and provides rm values of polluting/stopping/exit with options. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce Cournot competition and extend the entry-exit pollution model to the
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duopolistic framework. Section 4 shows some numerical results, and Section 5 concludes this
paper.
2 Monopoly
First, we consider the rm (labeled 1) produces $q_{1}$ units using technology at cost per unit $c_{1}$ in
monopoly market. Market demand is given by
$P(q_{1})=\theta-\eta q_{1}$ , (1)
so the optimal output of rm 1 is
$\frac{\partial}{\partial q_{1}}(Pq_{1}-c_{1}q_{1})=0 \Rightarrow q_{1}^{*}=\frac{\theta-c_{1}}{2\eta}$ , (2)
and equilibrium market price is
$P^{*}=P(q_{1}^{*})= \frac{\theta+c_{1}}{2}$ . (3)
Then, the rm's prot is given by
$\pi_{1}^{*}=P^{*}q_{1}^{*}-c_{1}q_{1}^{*}=\frac{(\theta-c_{1})^{2}}{4\eta}$ . (4)
We assume the rm has tax implications for pollution and the pollution tax is the form of
$\tau(q, x)=\lambda xq$ , (5)
where $\lambda$ is the constant tax rate and $x$ is the pollution rate which has the dynamics of
$dX_{t}=\alpha X_{t}dt+\sigma X_{t}dW_{t}, X_{0}=x$ . (6)
Then, rm's decision is as follows:
1. Pollute
The rm earns the prot $\pi_{1}^{*}$ and pollutes $q_{1}^{*}X_{t}.$
2. Suspend pollution
The rm maintains the technology at the cost $m$ and $q_{1}=0.$
3. Restart pollution
Restart requires the xed cost $K.$
4. Shut down
The rm incurs no cost.
Next, we derive value functions of rm 1 in monopoly. Suppose rm 1 produces $q_{1}^{*}$ and
pollutes forever, we have
$V_{0}(x)= \mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(\pi_{1}^{*}-\tau(q_{1}^{*}, X_{t}))dt]=\frac{(\theta-c_{1})^{2}}{4\eta r}-\frac{\theta-c_{1}}{2\eta}\frac{\lambdax}{r-\alpha}$ . (7)
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Value of polluting with the option to suspend is given by
$V_{1}(x)=V_{0}(x)+A_{1}x^{\beta_{1}}$ , (8)
where $A_{1}$ is an unknown coecient and
$\beta_{1}=\frac{-(\alpha-\sigma^{2}/2)+\sqrt{(\alpha-\sigma^{2}/2)^{2}+2\sigma^{2}r}}{\sigma^{2}}>1$ . (9)
Suppose the rm suspends pollution $(q_{1}=0)$ and maintain $(-m)$ the technology forever, we
have
$\mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(-m)dt]=-\frac{m}{r}$ . (10)
Value of stopping with the options to restart and exit is given by
$V_{2}(x)=- \frac{m}{r}+B_{1}x^{\beta_{1}}+B_{2}x^{\beta_{2}}$ , (11)
where $B_{1}$ and $B_{2}$ are unknown coecients and
$\beta_{2}=\frac{-(\alpha-\sigma^{2}/2)-\sqrt{(\alpha-\sigma^{2}/2)^{2}+2\sigma^{2}r}}{\sigma^{2}}<0$ . (12)
Suppose the rm shuts down the technology, we have
$V_{3}(x)=0$ . (13)
Finally, we have value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at three types of pollution
thresholds. At restart threshold $\underline{X}$ , we have
$V_{1}(\underline{X})-K=V_{2}(\underline{X})$ , (14)
$V_{1}'(\underline{X})=V_{2}'(\underline{X})$ . (15)
At suspend threshold $\overline{X}$ , we have
$V_{1}(\overline{X})=V_{2}(\overline{X})$ , (16)
$V_{1}'(X^{-})=V_{2}'(X^{-})$ . (17)
At exit threshold $\hat{X}$ , we have
$V_{2}(\hat{X})=0$ , (18)
$V_{2}'(\hat{X})=0$ . (19)
We nd three unknown coecients and three thresholds numerically using six boundary condi-
tions (14)$-(19)$ .
Figure 1 depicts value functions of rm 1 in monopoly for the base case parameter set:
$K=1,$ $m=0.1,$ $\lambda=0.25,$ $r=0.1,$ $\alpha=0.05,$ $\sigma=0.3,$ $\theta=1.3,$ $\eta=0.05$ and $c_{1}=0.5$ . Then, we
have $\pi_{1}^{*}=3.2,$ $q_{1}^{*}=8,$ $\underline{X}=1.206,$ $\overline{X}=2.120$ and $\hat{X}=7.626.$
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Figure 1: Value functions in monopoly.
3 Duopoly
In this section, we consider a duopoly market where two rms $i\neq j\in\{1$ , 2 $\}$ face Cournot
competition. Market demand is given by
$P(Q)=\theta-\eta Q, Q=q_{1}+q_{2}$ , (20)
so the optimal output is
$\frac{\partial}{\partial q_{i}}(Pq_{i}-c_{i}q_{i})=0 \Rightarrow q_{i}^{**}=\frac{\theta+c_{j}-2c_{i}}{3\eta}, Q^{**}=\frac{2\theta-c_{1}-c_{2}}{3\eta}$ , (21)
and equilibrium market price is
$P^{**}=P(Q^{**})= \frac{\theta+c_{1}+c_{2}}{3}$ . (22)
Then, the rm's prot is given by
$\pi_{i}^{**}=P^{**}q_{i}^{**}-c_{i}q_{i}^{**}=\frac{(\theta+c_{j}-2c_{i})^{2}}{9\eta}$ . (23)
W.l.o.g., we assume $c_{1}<c_{2}$ so that rm 2 suspends and exits earlier than rm 1. Then
market supply is as follows:
1. Both rms produce and pollute:
$q_{i}^{**}= \frac{\theta+c_{j}-2c_{i}}{3\eta}, Q^{**}=\frac{2\theta-c_{1}-c_{2}}{3\eta}$ , (24)
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Table 1: Possible market status for the base case.
$\overline{X}_{2} \hat{X}_{2} \overline{X}_{1} \hat{X}_{1}$
$1\overline{\sim}2arrow 3^{\underline{arrow}}4arrow 5$
$\underline{X}_{2} \overline{X}_{1}$
Figure 2: Status transition for the base case.
2. Firm 1 produces and rm 2 suspends/shuts down:
$Q^{**}=q_{1}^{*}= \frac{\theta-c_{1}}{2\eta}, q_{2}=0$ , (25)
3. Both rms suspend/shut down:
$q_{i}=0$ . (26)
Suppose $\underline{X}_{2}<\underline{X}_{1}<\overline{X}_{2}<\hat{X}_{2}<X_{1}<\hat{X}_{1}$ , possible market status is shown in Table 1. Statuses
1 and 2 are in duopoly, while statuses 3-5 are in monopoly. Then status transition is shown in
Figure 2.
Next, we derive value functions of rm 2 which is always in duopoly. The value of polluting
is given by
$V_{02}(x)= \mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(\pi_{2}^{**}-\tau(q_{2}^{**}, X_{t}))dt]$ (27)
$= \frac{(\theta+c_{1}-2c_{2})^{2}}{9\eta r}-\frac{\theta+c_{1}-2c_{2}}{3\eta}\frac{\lambda x}{r-\alpha}$ , (28)
$V_{12}(x)=V_{02}(x)+A_{12}x^{\beta_{1}}$ , (29)
the value of stopping is given by
$V_{22}(x)=- \frac{m}{r}+B_{12}x^{\beta_{1}}+B_{22}x^{\beta_{2}}$ , (30)
and value of exit is given by
$V_{32}(x)=0$ . (31)




suspend threshold $\overline{X}_{2}$ :
$V_{12}(\overline{X}_{2})=V_{22}(\overline{X}_{2})$ , (34)
$V_{12}'(\overline{X}_{2})=V_{22}'(\overline{X}_{2})$ , (35)
and exit threshold $\hat{X}_{2}$ :
$V_{22}(\hat{X}_{2})=0$ , (36)
$V_{22}'(\hat{X}_{2})=0$ . (37)
We nd three unknown coecients and three thresholds numerically using six boundary condi-
tions.
Finally, we derive value functions of rm 1. Firm 1 is in duopoly for statuses 1 and 2, while
in monopoly for statuses 3-5. For status 1 where both rms pollute, the value function of rm
1 is given by
$V_{01}(x)= \mathbb{E}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}(\pi_{1}^{**}-\tau(q_{1}^{**}, X_{t}))dt]$ (38)
$= \frac{(\theta+c_{2}-2c_{1})^{2}}{9\eta r}-\frac{\theta+c_{2}-2c_{1}}{3\eta}\frac{\lambda x}{r-\alpha}$ , (39)
$V_{11}(x)=V_{01}(x)+A_{11}x^{\beta_{1}}$ . (40)
For status 2 where rml pollutes and rm 2 suspends, we have
$V_{21}(x)=V_{0}(x)+B_{11}x^{\beta_{1}}+B_{21}x^{\beta_{2}}$ . (41)
Firm 1 in monopoly is already solved, that is, the value function for status 3 is $V_{1}(x)$ , $V_{2}(x)$
status 4 and $V_{3}(x)=0$ for status 5. From Figure 2, we have only value-matching conditions in
duopoly at rm $2$ 's restart threshold $\underline{X}_{2}$ :
$V_{11}(\underline{X}_{2})=V_{21}(\underline{X}_{2})$ , (42)
at rm $2$ 's suspend threshold $\overline{X}_{2}$ :
$V_{11}(\overline{X}_{2})=V_{21}(\overline{X}_{2})$ , (43)
and at rm $2$ 's exit threshold:
$V_{21}(\hat{X}_{2})=V_{1}(\hat{X}_{2})$ . (44)
We nd three unknown coecients numerically using three boundary conditions.
4 Numerical Analyses
In this section, we investigate dynamics of pollution and equilibrium market supply. We use
base case parameters: $K=1,$ $m=0.1,$ $\lambda=0.25,$ $r=0.1,$ $\alpha=0.05,$ $\sigma=0.3,$ $\theta=1.3,$
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Table 2: Pollution thresholds for the base case.
Figure 3: Value functions of rm 2 in duopoly.
$\eta=0.05,$ $c_{1}=0.5,$ $c_{2}=0.6$ . Additionally, we compute comparative statistics with respect to
environmental regulation $\lambda$ , market size $\theta$ and pollution uncertainty $\sigma.$
Table 2 shows pollution thresholds for the base case. Figures 3 and 4 show value functions
of rm 2 and 1 in duopoly. Figure 5 shows dynamics of pollution and equilibrium market
supply when pollution increases $(+$ $)$ and decreases Figure 6 shows pollution dynamics
when environmental regulation is strict $(\lambda=0.35)$ . In this case, market supply does not change,
however, duration and amount of pollution decreases.
Next, we investigate the impact of market size $\theta$ . When $\theta=1.5$ , pollution thresholds are in
the order of $\underline{X}_{2}<\underline{X}_{1}<\overline{X}_{2}<\overline{X}_{1}<\hat{X}_{2}<\hat{X}_{1}$ . In this case, possible market status and status
transition are shown in Table 3 and Figure 7, respectively. Statuses 1, 2 and 6 are in duopoly,
while statuses 3-5 are in monopoly. Note that status 6 aects only rm $1$ 's value function. For
status 6 where both rms suspend, the value function of rm 1 is given by
$V_{61}(x)=- \frac{m}{r}+C_{11}x^{\beta_{1}}+C_{21}x^{\beta_{2}}$ . (45)
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Figure 4: Value functions of rm 1 in duopoly.
Figure 5: Dynamics of pollution for the base case.
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Figure 6: Dynamics of pollution when environmental regulation is strict $(\lambda=0.35)$ .
Table 3: Possible market status when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ .
$\overline{X}_{2} X_{1} \hat{X}_{2} \hat{X}_{1}$
$1arrowarrow 2\Leftrightarrow 6arrow 4arrow 5$
$\underline{X}_{2} \underline{X}_{1} X_{1}^{-}\uparrow\downarrow\underline{X}_{1}$
3
Figure 7: Status transition when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ .
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Table 4: Pollution thresholds when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ .
Table 5: Possible market status when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .
We have value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at rm $1$ 's restart threshold $\underline{X}_{1}$ :
$V_{21}(\underline{X}_{1})-K=V_{61}(\underline{X}_{1})$ , (46)
$V_{21}'(\underline{X}_{1})=V_{61}'(\underline{X}_{1})$ , (47)
and at rm $1$ 's suspend threshold $\overline{X}_{1}$ :
$V_{21}(\overline{X}_{1})=V_{61}(\overline{X}_{1})$ , (48)
$V_{21}'(\overline{X}_{1})=V_{61}'(\overline{X}_{1})$ . (49)
In addition to value-matching conditions (42) at rm $2$ 's restart threshold $\underline{X}_{2}$ and (43) at rm
$2$ 's suspend threshold $\overline{X}_{2}$ , we have
$V_{61}(\hat{X}_{2})=V_{2}(\hat{X}_{2})$ , (50)
at rm $2$ 's exit threshold $\hat{X}_{2}.$
Table 4 shows pollution thresholds when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ . Figure 8 shows value
functions of rm 1. Figure 9 shows dynamics of pollution when pollution increases $(+$ $)$ and
decreases In this case, duration and amount of pollution increase, additionally, increment
of pollution increases compared to the base case.
Finally, we investigate the impact of pollution uncertainty $\sigma$ . When $\sigma=0.2$ , pollution
thresholds are in the order of $X_{2}<\hat{X}_{2}<\overline{X}_{2}<\underline{X}_{1}<\overline{X}_{1}<\hat{X}_{1}$ . In this case, possible market
status and status transition are shown in Table 6 and Figure 10, respectively. Statuses 1 is in
duopoly, while statuses 3-5 are in monopoly.
Note that rm 2 exits before suspends, therefore, status 2 does not exist in this case. We no
longer consider the value of suspend for rm 2, and we have value-matching and smooth-pasting
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Figure 8: Value functions of rm 1 in duopoly when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ .
Figure 9: Dynamics of pollution when market size is large $(\theta=1.5)$ .
$\hat{X}_{2} \overline{X}_{1} \hat{X}_{1}$
$1arrow 3arrowarrow 4arrow 5$
$\underline{X}_{1}$
Figure 10: Status transition when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .
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Table 6: Pollution thresholds when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .
Figure 11: Value functions of rm 2 in duopoly when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .




Table 6 shows pollution thresholds when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ . Figures 11
and 12 show value functions of rm 2 and 1. Figure 13 shows dynamics of pollution when
pollution increases $(+$ $)$ and decreases In this case, duration of pollution is longer than that
for the base case when pollution decreases due to early exit.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated pollution thresholds of entry-exit in Cournot competition where only a
cost-advantaged rm can enjoy monopoly. Especially, we consider uncertainty of pollution by
combining Wirl (2006) and Simpson (1995), while existing literature do not consider it. It is
shown that transition of market status varies with power of a disadvantaged rm. Analyses
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Figure 12: Value functions of rm 1 in duopoly when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .
Figure 13: Dynamics of pollution when pollution uncertainty is small $(\sigma=0.2)$ .
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of dynamics of pollution nd that environmental regulation decreases duration and amount of
pollution, pollution uncertainty increases duration and amount of pollution, and market size
increases increment of pollution.
Our remainders are welfare analysis and empirical studies. As a future study, it seems
important to consider the game theoretic approach in the duopolistic setting. To this end, we
need to develop a new equilibrium concept of entry-exit.
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